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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN GEORGIA:
BRINGING THE STATE OUT OF THE
TYPEWRITER AGE
Kevin Bradberry
INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 2008, U.S. Magistrate Judge Laporte of the U.S.
Northern District of California imposed hundreds of thousands of
dollars in sanctions on a party who failed to preserve certain
electronically stored documents.' Not only did the judge set record
high fines, but she also ordered an adverse jury instruction at the
2trial. Earlier that year in Qualcomm v. Broadcom, another judge
meted out an eight-and-a-half million dollar sanction against a party
and its attorneys for failure to use "crucial search terms" in retrieving
electronic documents. 3  Although technology has changed, those
changes have not altered the duty of counsel to satisfy discovery
obligations.
"It is refreshing to be able to cite authorities from the last century
... and to experience the rare and unusual assurance that ... the law
changes slowly or not at all. ' 4 Nonetheless, old rules that have served
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Georgia State University College of Law. He thanks his family and friends
for their love and support, and thanks the editors of the Georgia State University Law Review for this
opportunity.
1. David Narkiewicz, E-Discovery: The Essentials, 30-DEC PA. LAW. 18, 19 (2008) (citing Keithley
v. Homestore.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 3833384 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008)).
Although the adverse jury instruction was later overturned, this case illustrates the wide variety of tools
judges have at their disposal to punish negligent parties. See Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., No. C-03-
04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 4830752, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008).
2. Narkiewicz, supra note 1, at 19 (citing Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI
(EDL), 2008 WL 3833384 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008).
3. Laura Lewis Owens & Anna A. Summer, Discovery About Discovery, 783 PLI/LIT 343, 347
(2008). Missing search terms were not the only omissions Qualcomm made-the court found that
Qualcomm failed to perform basic searches, did not search the computers of the most relevant
employees, and did not attempt to correct its mistake once it knew the searches had been inadequate.
Thus, the court concluded that Qualcomm "intentionally withheld tens of thousands of decisive
documents from its opponent in an effort to win this case." Id. at 347-48 (citing Qualcomm, Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7,2008).
4. JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER, I1, 1 EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL EVIDENCE § 1:2 (2007)
(citing Quick v. State, 569 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Miss. 1990)).
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the community for some time must now adapt to new technology,
producing a less than seamless transition.5 The advent of the Digital
Age and the widespread use of computers for document processing,
information storage, and analytical computing present one such area
of difficulty. 6 In a world populated by people who still remember
(and sometimes prefer) the use of typewriters and slide rules,
computerized information confronts litigation attorneys with difficult
and expensive questions about what information is discoverable,
what should be protected, and what digital information is completely
irrelevant.7 This problem is exacerbated for attorneys practicing
within Georgia because the state has made little or no effort toward
adopting comprehensive electronic discovery (e-discovery) rules.
The purpose of this Note is to assist lawmakers in building a
template for addressing the arising issues with electronic discovery.
Part I of this Note contrasts the differences between conventional
discovery and electronic discovery, highlights some of the difficulties
that electronic documents present and explains why having a
particularized set of rules is important. 8 Part II discusses the various
approaches adopted in pursuing comprehensive e-discovery
guidelines, 9 and Part III concludes that Georgia should adopt the
2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with a few improvements and modifications. 10
5. A potential cause of problems, for example, may arise from the fact that an estimated thirty-five
percent of electronic documents have never been translated into a paper format. Martin H. Redish,
Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 591 (2001).
6. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 1:2; Steven C. Bennett & Cecilia R. Dickson, E-Discovery
May Be a Job for Special Masters, NAT'L L.J., at S5 (July 17, 2006) (more than ninety percent of
information is created and stored electronically); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM RULES RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
(2007) [hereinafter UNIFORM RULES].
7. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 1:3. Typical assumptions related to paper documents such
as assuming that litigants know what information they possess, and counting on counsel to have the
abilities to procure all that information are not always accurate in a digital world.
8. See discussion infra Part 1.
9. See discussion infra Part I.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
[Vol. 26:2
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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN GEORGIA
I. WHY ADAPT? DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
A. Comparative Differences
Considering society's increasing reliance on electronic documents
and their consequent use in litigation, the need for a standardized set
of rules is evident." Differences arising from digital and
conventional discovery are numerous but may be subdivided into
three general categories: volume, retrieval, and translation. 12 More
specifically, e-discovery presents special problems due to differences
in volume, dynamicism, dispersion, persistence, and
environment/structure dependence.' 
3
1. Volume
Digital information may take the form of e-mails, word processing
documents, spreadsheets, graphics, images, voice mail, electronic
calendars, internet bookmarks, cookies, and history logs. 14 Further
increasing the amount of discoverable documents is the fact that
11. See David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005)
("The duties of lawyers to raise, negotiate and resolve discovery issues, and the need for courts to
manage discovery actively, are more important for electronic discovery than they were for paper
discovery."); GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 6:5 (citing Corinne L. Giacobbe, Allocating
Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Electronically Stored
Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 258 (2000) (defendant who stored all materials potentially relevant
to litigation incurred costs in excess of three million dollars responding to discovery requests)).
12. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, at § 6:5; see also UNIFORM RULES, supra note 6, at I
("Principle among these differences is the sheer volume of information in electronic form, the virtually
unlimited places where the information may appear, and the dynamic nature of the information.").
13. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION, BEST
PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION (2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/publicationshtml (follow
"TSC PRINCP2nd ed 607.pdf' hyperlink; then enter name and e-mail address to download)
[hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION)]. Environment/structure dependence refers to
electronic data's coded format, without which the document may not be properly viewable.
14. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 1.2. For further discussion of how phones, faxes, and PDAs
might have discoverable information in electronic discovery, see id. § 6:8 (citing MICHAEL R. ARKFELD,
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 2.05[F] (2004) (noting that cell phones present another
potential source of electronic information, especially considering that they store addresses, names, e-
mail information, conversations, calendars, and in the case of voice-mail, metadata about the caller and
the length of the call)).
20101
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many systems automatically save multiple copies of documents on
digital backup tapes, several users may have copies of e-mails or
reports, and users typically save documents on both a private and
common drive. 15 With the advent of digital technology and the
widespread use of personal computers, personal communication
devices, and digital storage systems, vastly more electronic
documents exist than ever before, resulting in a significantly higher
number of documents that attorneys may discover in preparation of
litigation. 16 For example, in 1998 the U.S. Postal Service processed
only 1.98 billion pieces of hard copy mail, whereas electronic users
managed to send an estimated 182.5 billion e-mails in that same
year. 17 With such copious amounts of information it is important that
attorneys have clear rules governing discovery.
Electronic data is also "dynamic" in that it is "designed to change
over time even without human intervention."' 18 Data modification can
occur quite easily and inadvertently; for example, simply moving or
opening a digital document can alter its composition. 19 Many
software programs, such as word processing software, will
automatically save backups of documents without any specific
authorization by the user.
20
Due to the ease of modification, electronic data is also
characterized by a potential for dispersion that would not normally
15. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 2.
16. Id For further practical differences between electronic and traditional discovery, see Byers v.
Illinois State Police, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2008) ("A floppy disk, with 1.44 megabytes is the equivalent of 720
typewritten pages of plain text. A CD-ROM ... can hold up to 325,000 typewritten pages."). For a
discussion of types of electronic data, see generally GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 7:4
(discoverable information includes "active," "replicant," and "deleted" data).
17. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 3.
18. Id.; see also UNIFORM RULES, supra note 6, at 1 ("The ordinary operation of computers-
including the simple act of turning a computer on and off or accessing a particular file-can alter or
destroy electronically stored information."); GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 11:3 (citing Gates
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90 (D. Colo. 1996) (an action as simple as clicking on
and opening a file will alter its "last-accessed" date, which could lead to the prejudicial conclusion that
someone altered the document)).
19. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 3.
20. Id.
[Vol. 26:2
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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN GEORGIA
occur in conventional documents. 2 1 In the course of an electronic
document's life, it may be copied multiple times, including drafts and
comments. Documents saved on a "network computer, which is
[supported by] a server, which, in turn, is being backed up on tape ...
on a daily, weekly [,] or monthly basis" can create hundreds or
22thousands of documents located in many unexpected places.
Locating and examining multiple copies of the same document
ultimately forces litigants to spend much more time and money on
document examination.
Further, digital categorization does not always share the simplicity
of human filing systems. Although electronic information may be
well categorized and sorted in one system, users operating on another
system may encounter difficulties in accessing these same files.
Magnetic backup tapes, for example, are intended for purposes of
disaster system recovery, and they store information in a mass of data
not easily recognizable by anything other than the native computer
system.23 Production of such vast and often incomprehensible stores
of information requires comprehensive discovery rules.
2. Retrieval
The high volume of electronic data underscores the potential
difficulties in retrieving data. Appropriate electronic document
retrieval can pose a serious challenge for litigators because gaining
access to copies or originals can present an extremely difficult and
expensive venture, often requiring "the retention of high-priced
forensic experts." 24 For example, restoring particular documents from
magnetic backup tapes is impossible without restoring the entire
contents of the tape, which may contain thousands upon thousands of
21. See GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 6:8 (in the short time it may take a document to travel
around the world, there is a high possibility it has been subsequently saved on multiple different
systems); John L. Carroll, Discovery Disputes and Electronic Media, SCG045 ALI-ABA 421,425 (2001).
22. Cameron G. Shilling, Electronic Discovery: Litigation Crashes into the Digital Age, 22 LAB.
LAW. 207, 212 (2006) (quoting McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001)).
23. Id.
24. See Redish, supra note 5, at 590.
20101
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documents.25 Unfortunately, parties have to endure the enormous
costs of restoring backup tapes anyway because it is highly doubtful
that a responding party would simply hand over an entire tape
without taking the time to remove nonessential and privileged
documents. 26 Further, responding parties must take particular care to
hand the data over in a usable, convenient format. Doing otherwise
could lead to court-ordered sanctions.
The persistence of digital information compounds this difficulty.
Whereas shredding a paper document more or less destroys it
permanently,27 "deleting" an electronic file does not actually erase
the file.28 Upon deletion, the computer simply removes the file name
and makes the space available to write over. As a result, a document
"deleted" years ago could still persist on the drive.
29
The existence of metadata further complicates the process.30
electronic document includes not only visible text but also hidden
text, formatting codes, formulae, and other information associated
with a file.31 These often-unseen components are called metadata.
Metadata may include, but is not limited to, document create and edit
dates, authorship information, and comments.32 This hidden "data
about data" is typically only viewable in the native format of the
document and even then its natural camouflage may persist.33 In
addition to retrieval issues, metadata itself presents numerous
25. Shilling, supra note 22, at 212; see Zublake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing how restoring data from backup tapes becomes a lengthy and complicated
process). A backup tape takes about five days to restore, and although this professional service can
accomplish the task, that option costs much more money. Shilling, supra note 22.
26. See Redish, supra note 5, at 591.
27. But see Douglas Heingartner, Back Together Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at GI
(describing technology that can reconstruct shredded paper documents).
28. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 3; see also GRENIG & GLEISNER,
supra note 4, § 1:4 (2007) (citing David Kesmodel, Not Fade Away: Lawyers' Delight: Old Web
Material Doesn't Disappear, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2006, at Al (a "deleted" file may, in fact, be
admissible as evidence in court)); FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
29. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 3.
30. See GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 1:5 (2007) (a hardcopy version of an electronic
document is rarely the same thing as the document as it exists in its native electronic format); see also
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 656 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that when
producing documents, lawyers should take care to ensure the metadata remains intact).
31. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 60.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Marjorie A. Shields, Discoverability of Metadata, 29 A.L.R.6th 167, § 2 (2007).
[Vol. 26:2
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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN GEORGIA
potential problems. Given metadata's hidden nature, attorneys may
fall prey to inadvertent disclosure.34 In order to prevent accidental
disclosure, many companies have taken to "scrubbing" electronic
documents clean of metadata. 35 Such electronic alteration raises the
possibility of destruction or inadvertent transmission of metadata that
could constitute an ethical violation.36 Electronic discovery rules
should therefore attempt to specifically define litigants' role in
retrieval and in the ethical handling of metadata.
3. Translation
Finally, electronic documents differ from conventional documents
in that they may require translation into a native format. 37 "A paper
document is simply a matter of reading. An electronic document, on
the other hand, may have been stored in any one of hundreds of
different formats." 38 Unlike paper documents, which have little or no
translation difficulties, electronic documents may become
"incomprehensible when separated from [their] environment., 39
Further, "thirty-five percent of electronically stored data have never
been transformed into paper form," so there is no base of reference
for translation.40 For example, it is a matter of common knowledge
34. Id.; see GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 7:1 (2007) (pointing out that for every hardcopy of
a document that exists there is probably an electronic document that "tell[s]" an interesting story" about
that document).
35. Shields, supra note 33, § 2 (explaining that some available software can "scrub" electronic
documents and remove the metadata from a document).
36. Id. For further discussion of the interplay between ethical implications and professional
responsibility concerning the use of metadata, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 06-422 (2006).
37. See GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, at § 1:3. "Native format" refers to the format in which
the document was created. Since a document is a "structured set of data," removing the digital document
from that structure, as can occur when e-mailing a document or saving it, may render the document
incomprehensible and thereby useless. For example, viewing only the raw data, formulas, and numbers
of a business spreadsheet is useless if one cannot also see the columns, labels, and other markings in the
document. Electronic translation into a different format can result in the inadvertent modification of
those important markings.
38. Redish, supra note 5, at 591 n.121 (quoting ALAN M. GAHTAN, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 1, 7
(1999)); see SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 8 (stating that the existence of
documents in electronic format may make discovery easier if documents can be translated efficiently
from their native formats).
39. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 4.
40. Redish, supra note 5, at 591.
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that a document created with new word processing software may not
be readable in an older version of that same program, and anyone
who has received a document full of squares, triangles, and hyphens
has encountered translation problems firsthand.4'
Even if a party is willing to produce a document on paper for
simplicity's sake, an opposing party may still seek the document in
its original native format. 42 The proliferation of processing platforms
and frequent upgrades to those environments exacerbates the problem
since information "cannot be easily accessed outside the operating
system that created it."'43 As newer platforms render old ones
obsolete, attorneys will likely face increasing difficulty in finding
technicians familiar with the older systems.
44
B. Why Courts Need Specific Standards for Electronic Discovery
Electronic discovery raises difficult and divisive questions about
how traditional concepts of fairness should be expressed in the
courts.45 In many cases, the dramatically different nature of electronic
documents requires updating existing rules.46  Notions of
preservation, privilege, and proportionality are perhaps the most
important in this new arena.
47
41. Environment dependence is not simply limited to software dependence, but may also include
passwords, encryption, and other security features that disable viewing of a document without the proper
authorization. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 4 n.8.
42. Redish, supra note 5, at 591 n.123 ("Even though many companies and individuals continue to
store paper copies of various documents, it is important to recognize that ... an adversary can still
demand the same information in a usable electronic format." Such a tactic may be especially useful, for
example, when metadata exists that identifies the true author of a document.) (citing Corinne L.
Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding nho Should Bear the Costs
of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 257, 262 (2000)).
43. Shilling, supra note 22, at 211.
44. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 4.
45. See discussion supra Part I.
46. See discussion supra Part I.
47. See generally Steven C. Bennett, Managing E-Discovery: Some Essential Issues, 859 PLI/PAT
219 (2006).
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1. Preservation Obligations
Although an attorney's duty to preserve documents remains the
same in the electronic world, the question of how to do so has
become increasingly complicated.48  Preservation issues pose
difficulties particularly because (1) preservation obligations usually
arise before the parties have met and conferenced, (2) the vast
amount of data can make costs of preservation astronomical, (3)
consequences of failure to preserve can be extreme, and (4) electronic
data cannot be easily categorized.49 The duty to preserve material
evidence typically arises when a party reasonably should know that
the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation. 50 The failure to
do so can and often will prompt punishment by sanction.51 Despite
this seemingly clear definition, determining when the duty to
preserve arises, and resolving what information is "material
evidence" continues to plague courts. 52 The only useful standard
litigants have is that they do not have to "preserve every shred of
paper" but only "unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an
48. Id. at 223. The duty to preserve refers to a duty not to destroy certain documents. Id. ("All
lawyers know that it would be a violation of a preservation obligation to destroy 300,000 pages of
relevant material. But now they must be aware that that is exactly what can happen if someone reuses,
overwrites or erases a single computer disk."); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP, THE
SEDONA PRINCIPLES (FIRST EDITION) (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
content/miscFiles/publicationshtml (follow "7_05TSP.pdf' hyperlink; then enter name and e-mail
address to download) [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES (FIRST EDITION)] ("A preservation order to save
'all records pertaining to the manufacture of X' could, if all documents were paper documents, be
applied logically by a party ... [but] in the electronic age, such a command could present intractable
problems."); see also Isom, supra note 11, at 11 (companies have a responsibility to preserve documents
normally, but court ordering of preservation of some documents can substantially increase the likelihood
that parties will observe preservation requirements).
49. Bennett, supra note 47, at 223; SEDONA PRINCIPLES (FIRST EDITION), supra note 48, at 7 (stating
that unfair burdens in discovery could be minimized if litigants had available a set of standardized and
formalized rules).
50. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 11:4, (considering Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836
F.2d 1104, 112 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that frequent discovery requests for a particular type of
document may establish reasonable foreseeability of the document's use in future litigation)).
51. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583,590 (4th Cir. 2001).
52. Redish, supra note 5, at 619 n.213 (citing Richard F. Ziegler & Seth A. Stuhl, Spoliation Issues
Arise in Digital Era, NAT'L L.J., Feb 16, 1998, at B9 ("The murkiest aspect of spoliation law is the
determination of when the obligation to preserve evidence arises .... Judges seem to take a fact based,
'I know it when I see it' approach.")).
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adversary." 53  Such subjective considerations lead to hopeful
guesswork at best and serious abuse at worst.
These general guidelines prompt interesting questions of what
information is material and what documents the responding party
must produce.54 What happens, for example, when relevant evidence
is not in the physical possession of a party or if a party fails to
produce duplicative documents that are stored in a different format?
55
In answering such questions, a court usually considers the burden
imposed by such extensive discovery.56 As with traditional discovery,
many courts hold that inconvenience and expense are not valid
reasons for the denial of electronic discovery.57 These holdings,
however, demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of the burdens in this
area, since the sheer volume of electronic documents can make any
production request unduly burdensome. 58
Potential litigants may encounter serious difficulties in isolating
and preserving important material, but they must also take care to
prevent "spoliation." Spoliation is the "destruction, significant
alteration, or non preservation of evidence relevant to pending or
53. Martha J. Dawson, Electronic Discovery Today, 716 PLI/LIT 7, 30 (2004) (citing Zublake v.
UBS Warburg L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
54. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at ii (parties should meet early on in
the litigation process and seek to determine the scope of any electronic discovery and which parties will
bear the burden).
55. Bennett, supra note 47, at 228-29 (2006) ("[Many] cases make clear that litigants need to ask-
and answer--this question: Who has (or where is) the electronic evidence relating to this case?"); see,
e.g., United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989)
("A corporation must produce documents possessed by a subsidiary that the parent corporation owns.");
In re Uranium, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1156 (holding that the physical location of documents is irrelevant
and granting motions to compel defendants to produce foreign documents); Keir v. UnumProvident
Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747 at *7, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 22, 2003) (finding that
defendant failed to communicate in a timely manner preservation obligation to a third-party provider of
e-mail and other computer services).
56. Zublake, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
57. Redish, supra note 5, at 574-75.
58. Id. at 575. Some courts, however, have shown less reluctance to protect parties from undue
burden. See, e.g., Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 1982) (district court
denied production request); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (holding that the producing party must be "protected against undue burden and expense and/or
invasion of privileged matter").
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reasonably foreseeable litigation,"5 9 and it occurs quite frequently in
electronic discovery cases.6° Spoliation may come about intentionally
or unintentionally. It can even occur as a result of honest good faith
efforts, including, for example, routine virus scans that delete
temporary files in order to protect the computer.61 Spoliation, in
whatever form it may take, creates an "imbalance between the
litigating parties," and the court may choose to remedy the imbalance
by imposing sanctions.62 Litigants should be aware that sanctions
have been imposed for intentional misconduct, negligence, and even
"purposeful sluggishness." 63 The volume of electronic documents
also has the potential to increase the volume of sanctions-courts are
not afraid of imposing record high sanctions on attorneys guilty of
spoliation.6
59. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 11:2. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590
(4th Cir. 2001); Zublake, 220 F.R.D. at 216; Barsoum v. NYC Hous. Auth., 202 F.R.D. 396, 399
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
60. Isom, supra note 11, at 14 ("Spoliation cases are much more prevalent in electronic discovery
than in paper discovery, perhaps because electronic information is more likely to be destroyed
inadvertently than paper and because, whether information is destroyed intentionally or accidentally, the
destruction of all copies of electronic information is so much more difficult to accomplish and difficult
to hide than with paper."); see, e.g., United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 46 n.8
(D. Conn. 2002) (discussing that most deleted documents can be recovered with the proper amount of
expertise unless the storage unit has been completely physically destroyed).
61. See GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 11:2; Id. § 11:6 (when determining whether to impose
sanctions, the court should consider whether a party that has destroyed documents had a culpable state
of mind); see also AMLI Residential Props., Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., 667 S.E.2d 150, 155 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008) ("In determining whether sanctions for spoliation are warranted, the trial court must weigh the
degree of the spoliator's culpability against the prejudice to the opposing party.").
62. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 11:2.
63. Isom, supra note 11, at 26 (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d
99, 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that district courts "should not countenance 'purposeful sluggishness'
... and should be prepared to impose sanctions where they encounter it")); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 95 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Bad faith is not essential. If such evidence is mishandled through
carelessness ... the district court is entitled to consider imposing sanctions."); Schmid v. Milwaukee
Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing the considerations a court should use when
deciding whether to use sanctions). But see SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at ii
(stating that a court should only consider sanctions when "there was a clear duty to preserve, a culpable
failure to preserve and produce relevant electronically stored information, and a reasonable probability
that the loss of evidence has materially prejudiced the adverse party").
64. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *20 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 7, 2008) (imposing eight and a half million dollars of sanctions on attorneys guilty of gross
spoliation misconduct); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., No.
5:98CV2876, 1:01CV1078, 2004 WL 3192729, at *36 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2004) (holding that a default
judgment against defendant who destroyed or failed to preserve electronic documents was acceptable);
see also Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (a reasonable retention
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2. Privilege
Determining whether privilege exists presents another murky
concept when electronic discovery is involved. The increase in
potentially discoverable material has unsurprisingly prompted an
increase in material that companies may want to protect.65  In
particular, attorneys have faced confusion concerning whether e-
mails qualify for attorney-client privilege. Although e-mail
communications between the attorney and client concerning a legal
issue typically qualify, courts still have to determine whether there
exists a "reasonable expectation" of confidentiality. 66  Storing
documents in databases presents another dilemma: attorneys must
balance a desire to create a centralized repository of potentially
relevant information against the hazard of creating a prime target for
parties requesting documents.
67
3. Proportionality
When complying with e-discovery requests, producing parties are
often confronted by the potential for significant expense. As
mentioned previously, the large volume of electronic documents can
mean great expense for those producing documents.68 While the rules
normally assume that a "responding party bears the expense of
policy may not be sufficient to avoid sanctions, especially when future litigation is reasonably
foreseeable). But see, e.g., State v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 181 Misc. 2d 595, 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(where litigation looms "merely possible," routine document disposal is unlikely to result in spoliation
sanctions); Szymanska v. Abbott Labs., No. 93 C 3033, 1994 WL 118154, at *11 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
1994) ("The mere possibility of litigation... does not trigger the duty to keep documents.").
65. Martha J. Dawson, Electronic Discovery Today, 716 PLI/LIT 7,39 (2004).
66. Bennett, supra note 47, at 237 (citing State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d
677, 689 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that e-mail involving an attorney communicating as either a sender or
recipient may not automatically qualify for protection)); see also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,
418-19 (U.S. Ct. App. Armed Forces 1996) (holding that an expectation of privacy in an e-mail is
subject to the type of e-mail sent and the recipient).
67. A company that efficiently stores all its records in one large database, for example, may become
extremely vulnerable if a court orders production of that database. Bennett, supra note 47, at 239
("Typically, a party who develops a litigation support system will look to the work product doctrine as
the principle source for protecting the system .... As a general rule, the greater the [] input by counsel,
the greater the degree of protection.").
68. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 6:5.
[Vol. 26:2
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 562 2009-2010
562 I    i.  
. ilege 
     
  
i ll  l    
    
,  i  i   
li t il 
ti s   
    
l  t ti n"  66  
  :  
 r    
 
r ti  docu ents. 67 
 ortionality 
 ry   
i l t .  
   
  6    
 i   f 
        l  
l ). ,  ' ,  . ,  
( r  liti ti  l  r l  i le," r ti  t i l i  li l  t  lt i  li ti  
ti ); s a . tt ., .   3,1   , t  .  . . . . , 
1994) (" he ere ssi ilit  flitigation ... es t tri er t e t  t  ee  c e ts."). 
. art a J. s , lectronic isc very y,  II I  , 39 ( ). 
. tt,  t  , t  iti  t t   i. . . i .  . . . ,  . . d 
,  . .        i ti g    
r i i t  t t ti ll  li   t tion»;  l  it  t t  . ll,  . . , 
--1  ( . . t. .    l i  t t  t ti        
t  i t). 
.   t t ffi i tl  st r s ll its r r s i   l r  t s , f r l ,   
tr l  l r l  if  rt r rs r ti  f t t t . tt, ra t  , t  
( i ll ,  rt   l   liti ti  rt t  ill l  t  t   t t i   
t  ri i l    t ti  t  t    l ,       l, 
 ). 
. I   I , s r  t  ,  : . 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/2
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN GEORGIA
,,69
complying with discovery requests, courts may place limits or
conditions on electronic discovery. 70 In the seminal case of Zublake
v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., the court articulated a new test in order to
allow parties to obtain the "fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial." The three step analysis clearly laid out how
discovery costs should be allocated.7' In particular, the court
modified an old factor test to clarify the factors a court should
consider in cost balancing. That seven factor balancing test serves as
the most influential step in the analysis. 72  The test includes
components such as the extent to which the request is specifically
tailored, the availability of the information from other sources, and
the total cost of production compared to the amount in controversy.73
69. Robert S. Shwarts, The Age of the Electronic Workplace, 762 PLI/LIT 625, 655 (2007) (citing
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)); SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND
EDITION), supra note 13, at ii ("Absent a specific objection, party agreement or court order, the
reasonable costs of retrieving and reviewing electronically stored information should be bome by the
responding party, unless the information sought is not reasonably available to the responding party in the
ordinary course of business.").
70. GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 4, § 9:1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (stating that the court may
order protection for information that may not be easily discovered because of undue cost.")); see also In
re Auto. Refinishing Paint, 229 F.R.D. 482, 496-97 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that producing parties may
receive compensation for the discovery requests of third parties); see generally ABA Discovery
Standards 57-65 (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf (articulating
standards for electronic discovery).
71. Zublake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding the necessary
analysis to include: (1) a presumption that the responding party should pay the costs of production, and a
court should consider cost-shifting only when electronic data is relatively inaccessible; (2) if the
responding party is required to produce relatively inaccessible information, such as backup tapes,
requiring the responding party to restore and produce documents from a small sample of requested
backup tapes will lessen the burden; and (3) seven weighted factors should be considered).
72. Id. at 321. The original test was articulated in Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,
205 F.R.D. 421, 428-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (factoring (1) specificity of discovery requests; (2) likelihood
of discovering relevant information; (3) availability of that information from other sources; (4) purposes
for which data is maintained; (5) relative benefits to the parties; (6) total cost of production; (7) relative
ability of each party to control costs; and (8) the resources available to each party). The Zublake court
considered the Rowe test incomplete, noting in particular the fact that Rowe did not mention either the
amount in controversy or the importance of the issues at stake, and eliminated the factor that took into
account the resources available to each party. Despite the presentation of the factors, the court noted that
the "factors should not be weighed equally," saying that courts often are "tempt[ed] to treat the factors
as a check-list, resolving the issue in favor of whichever column has the most checks." Zublake, 217
F.R.D. at 322.
73. Id. at 324 (finding that the plaintiff was entitled to all e-mails and electronic documents relevant
to the claim, including those only preserved on backup tapes, but because the expense of exploring and
recovering the tapes was sufficiently high, cost-shifting became appropriate); see also Shwarts, supra
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Despite the codification of electronic discovery rules in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the cost-shifting issue persists.
74
II. APPROACHES TO SOLVING THE E-DISCOVERY ISSUE
Part I suggested some of the difficulties that may arise in
confronting electronic discovery and discussed the reasons that
directed e-discovery rules are necessary. 75 Part II will address several
of the approaches taken by the federal government and the states.
76
A. 2006 Amendments to the Rules of Federal Procedure
The new federal rules, as amended, attempt to address the
problems inherent in electronic discovery. 77  Members of the
Advisory Committee, who were charged with the task of formulating
the new rules, sought to "[a]mend the rules to make it clear that e-
mail and other computer information are subject to discovery [,]...
to get clients to take this discovery seriously," and to tell litigators
"exactly what to do."78 Therefore, the drafters intended to provide an
enduring, uniform set of guidelines that helpfully tackle the issues of
burdens and expenses in electronic discovery, while also providing
procedures for judges' managerial roles.79 The new amendments
apply to all cases filed after December 1, 2006.80
note 69,at 657-58 (noting that the weight placed on certain factors "reinforced ... the traditional
presumption that the producing party bears the cost" of production).
74. Zublake, 217 F.R.D. at 318 (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)
(protecting a party from "undue burden or expense" may include conditioning discovery on the
requesting party's payment of the costs)).
75. See discussion infra Part 1.
76. See discussion infra Part II.
77. Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their
Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 884 (2008).
78. Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 321, 331
(2008).
79. Hytken, supra note 77, at 884-86 (2008); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's
note (2006 Amendment) (discussing the difficulties of providing a standardized rule that takes into
account "the different types of technological features that may affect the burdens and costs of accessing
electronically stored information").
80. Colleen M. Kenney, Electronic Discovery in State Courts After the New Federal Rules
Amendments, 766 PLI/LIT 341, 343 (2007).
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1. Production and Proportionality
The new rules now consider "electronically stored information"
(ESI) within the scope of initial disclosures mandated by Rule 26.81
The rule recognizes the role that ESI plays in modem litigation and
also attempts to limit the costs of production. 82 Thus, Rule 26
provides that a party does not have to provide ESI from sources "that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden of costs." 83 The rule effectively creates a two-tiered system of
discovery, the first of which includes all information available and
relevant to any party's claim or defense. 84 The second "tier" protects
parties from having to produce information that is not reasonably
accessible thereby creating a presumption of non-discoverability for
that tier. The responding party must show that the information is not
"reasonably accessible" due to burden or high cost, and to rebut this
presumption the requesting party must show "good cause,
considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 86
In its commentary to the rules, the Advisory Committee offers
several factors reminiscent of those in Zublake to help determine
"good cause." 87  Rule 26 establishes a proportionality test to
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006
Amendment) ("[ESI] has the same broad meaning in Rule 26(a)(1) as in Rule 34(a).").
82. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment) ("The amendment to
Rule 26(b)(2) is designed to address issues raised by difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing
discovery of some electronically stored information.").
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
84. See Hytken, supra note 77, at 890 (noting that the courts treat reasonably accessible ESI as
presumptively discoverable because production would not require too much time or effort); FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2)(B).
85. Hytken, supra note 77, at 890.
86. Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) allows a court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery
otherwise allowed if it determines that: (1) the discovery is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
can more easily be obtained from another source; (2) the party seeking discovery has had ample time to
obtain the information by discovery; (3) the burden or expense presented outweighs its likely benefit.
Although the presumption of non-discoverability seems to protect responding parties from undue
cost associated with production, "more courts than not have made a 'good cause' finding" and address
the factors in 26(c) somewhat broadly. See Geoff Howard, Trends in Electronic Discovery After the
December 1, 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 766 PLI/LIT 13, 18-19 (2007)
("Of the nine cases available for electronic searching that reached the step of an inquiry into 'good
cause' under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), courts found the requesting party had established 'good cause' in seven
of them .... ).
87. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's comment (2006 Amendment)
("Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of
20101
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determine production and directs courts to consider not only whether
burdens and costs of production are prohibitively high, but also
whether those burdens can be justified in the circumstances of the
case. The test asks whether the discovery is "unreasonably
cumulative," whether the burden outweighs the benefit, and other
similar factors.
89
Amended Rules 33, 34, and 45 further simplify discovery
procedures relating to ESI. 90 Rule 34(b)(2)(E) places ESI within the
scope of production requests, mandates that parties produce
documents "as they are kept in the usual course of business," 91 and
"permits requesting parties to 'test' or 'sample' (in addition to inspect
or copy) both [ESI] and hard copy materials." 92 Rule 33(d) allows a
party to use ESI in response to a request to produce business
documents, and Rule 45 now treats discovery of ESI from non-parties
in a "manner similar to discovery of such materials from parties,"
including requirements that production be in a "reasonably usable"
form.9 3  Rule 45 also permits use of a subpoena for purposes of
"testing and sampling" documents, but cautions courts to "enforce
[the protective provisions of Rule 45(c)] with vigilance when such
demands are made."
94
information available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources;
(4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more
easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information;
(6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties' resources."), with Zublake
v. UBC Warburg, L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
88. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
89. Id. But see Howard, supra note 86, at 17-18 ("This determination may be complicated, however,
because the court and the parties 'may know little about what information the sources identified as not
reasonably accessible might contain, whether it is relevant, or how valuable it may be to the litigation."')
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment)).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 33, 34, 45. See generally Kenney, supra note 80, at 343.
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
92. Kenney, supra note 80, at 344.
93. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (recognizing that "discovery of [ESI] ... may impose burdens on the
responding person"); FED. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment) ("[Rule 451
provides protection against undue impositions on nonparties.").
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1) advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
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2. Spoliation
The federal rules also define parties' preservation responsibilities
and make sure that innocent parties do not face punishment for good
faith mistakes. 95 The Advisory Committee recognized that parties
requesting and producing ESI might face thousands or millions of
easily corruptible documents and that simply due to the number of
documents, some would inevitably fall through the cracks. 96 Rule
37(e) now provides that "[albsent exceptional circumstances, a court
may not impose sanctions ... on a party for failing to provide [ESI]
lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system." 97 This "safe harbor" rule helps to protect parties
who maintain ordinary in-house cleaning measures, and at the same
time, establishes a basis for sanctions when necessary. 98 The rule
reflects an understanding of normal day-to-day business operations
and allows producing parties to avoid large, formerly unavoidable
sanctions.
99
95. See FED. R. Civ. P.37.
96. Hytken, supra note 77, at 891; see also Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes of the April
Meeting, at 18 (Apr. 15-16, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf
("Reasonable steps do not always preserve everything. Things slip through. That is the point of the safe
harbor.").
97. FED. R. Cirv. P. 37(e); see also Kenney, supra note 80, at 344 ("FRCP 37 adds a new 'safe
harbor' provision that protects a party under certain limited circumstances from being sanctioned for
non-production of electronically stored information that has been lost."). See generally Thomas Y.
Allman, Defining Culpability: The Search for a Limited Safe Harbor in Electronic Discovery, 2 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 65, 75 (2007) (noting that early versions of the Rule strongly considered the voluminous
nature of ESI, and would have protected a party unless it "violated an order in the action requiring it to
preserve [ESI]"). But see Thomas Y. Altman, Addressing State E-Discovery Issues Through
Rulemaking: The Case for Adopting the 2006 Federal Amendments, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 233, 236 n.25
(2007) (noting that safe harbor provisions could cause companies to purge information and hide behind
the shield of "routine business practice").
98. Hytken, supra note 77, at 892. A party may benefit from the safe harbor provision when it acts in
good faith, implements a litigation hold, and ESI loss results from "the routine operation of an electronic
information system." Id. at 893 (citing FED R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006
Amendment)). The author also notes that the burden faced by corporations trying to preserve back up
tapes that saved information lost in the course of normal operations was incredibly high before Rule 37.
Id. In many cases, the "expense of preservation often overwhelmed parties, leading them to settle." Id.
(citing Andrew M. Scherffius et al., Conference on Electronic Discovery, Panel Four: Rule 37 and/or a
New Rule 34.1: Safe Harbors for E-Document Preservation and Sanctions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 79
(2004)).
99. Hytken, supra note 77, at 891.
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3. Privilege
The new rules encourage the use of "claw back" or "quick peek"
agreements: a method used to protect parties against accidental
production of privileged documents. i00 Those agreements allow the
requesting party to examine documents while preserving the right of
the producing party to assert privilege when necessary.' 0 ' Although
such agreements fall more towards evidentiary issues than discovery,
the 2006 amendments encourage the party receiving the electronic
discovery to respect confidentiality in return for the producing party
disclosing documents in an expedited fashion.'
1 02
B. Other Solutions
Although the Federal Rules promise solutions to a number of
problems with e-discovery, state courts have been unwilling to utilize
them.'0 3 Despite common misperceptions that e-discovery litigation
takes place only or even primarily on the federal level, "most
litigation is in the state courts."' 104 Although many state courts tend to
adopt the style of federal analysis, few citations to the new e-
100. Id. at 887. "Quick peek" agreements typically occur when the producing party voluntarily gives
electronically stored information to the opposing party without first reviewing it for privilege or
confidentiality. The documents are, of course, subject to the highest level of confidence during that time.
Once the receiving party has taken a "quick peek" and selected relevant documents, the producing party
may "claw back" any documents it deems privileged, without having waived any privilege. While
potentially risky, this arrangement allows the producing party to reduce costs associated with
preproduction reviews for confidentiality and privilege. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION),
supra note 13, at 54-55.
101. Hytken, supra note 77, at 888. Many courts have recognized the value of these agreements-
prior to the 2003 Zublake case, six courts recognized such provisions. Id (citing Zublake v. UBS
Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8 (D.
Mass. 2000); Ames v. Black Entm't Television, No. 98CIV0226, 1998 WL 812051, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1998); Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 439 (D.D.C. 1984); W. Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington
N. R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. Wyo. 1984); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 42
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950)).
102. Hytken, supra note 77, at 889 ("[The rules] cannot 'limit the consequences of inadvertent
disclosure' because privilege-a substantive, evidentiary issue-lies beyond the reach of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.").
103. Renee T. Lawson, I Know About the Federal eDiscovery Rules, Now What About the States?,
766 PLI/LIT 357, 364 (2007) (discussing the "federal influence on the state courts-or surprising lack
thereof').
104. Marcus, supra note 78, at 333.
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discovery rules or crucial court decisions such as Zublake exist.10 5
Further, as of late 2008, only about a third of the states have adopted
or are contemplating adopting portions of the amendments to the
Federal Rules.'
0 6
Many states have stepped up to fill the void by creating their own
e-discovery rules.' 0 7 Illinois, for example, has taken a fairly simplistic
approach to the problem. Instead of adopting comprehensive rules
relating to e-discovery, Illinois Supreme Court rules define "all
retrievable information in computer storage" to be within the scope of
discovery. 108
Additionally, substantive differences in state procedure may
require a differing interpretation from Federal Rules. 10 9 Despite these
difficulties, however, several unique methodologies have emerged to
help states cope with electronic discovery.
1. "Wait It Out"
Some states adopt a practical "wait and see" approach and observe
how the Federal Rules are treated by courts across the country.1 10 In
fact, a great many states have declined to review the new rules,
preferring to continue with their old system or perhaps waiting to see
what happens with the new rules."' Alabama has, for example, been
debating whether to promulgate regulations "similar to the
amendments to the federal rules, [those] along the lines of the
[Uniform Rules] or something else." ' 1 2  California, with "its
105. Lawson, supra note 103, at 364.
106. Kenney, supra note 80, at 346-51.
107. Illinois, Mississippi, and Texas have elected to pursue their own independent systems. Kenney,
supra note 80, at 352.
108. Kenney, supra note 80, at 352. (citing ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(1), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/ArtII/Artll.htm#201).
109. Illinois, for example, has different preservation obligations than federal courts, and makes
available a separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence. Such claims must be resolved before
preservation agreements can be made between parties. Jeffrey A. Parness, E-Disovery in Illinois Civil
Actions, 95 ILL. B.J. 150, 151 (2007).
110. Lawson, supra note 103, at 362.
111. For a discussion of which states have yet to adopt the Federal Rules, see Kenney, supra note 80,
at 345; Lawson, supra note 103, at 367.
112. George M. Dent, II, Discovery of Electronically Stored Information-Potential Alabama Civil
Procedure Rules, 69 ALA. LAW. 106, 107 (2008).
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significant inventory of litigation," initially hesitated to adopt new
regulations, 113 but has since "moved forward on proposed rules and
statutes for e-discovery."
' 14
This approach obviously disadvantages state lawyers who need to
know how to conduct electronic discovery, but, on the other hand,
allows states to remain flexible to see what works. Such a method,
however, may include a long wait period-the Advisory Committee
drafted the rules with endurance in mind, specifically choosing not to
incorporate a list of current technologies in favor of long term
flexibility. 15 Therefore, waiting for full and complete interpretations
of the rules could leave state attorneys in an informational vacuum
for many years to come.
2. "Grab Life by the Horns "-the Texas Approach
In 1996, Texas became the first state to adopt rules regulating e-
discovery, ten years before its federal counterparts. 1 16 Texas rules
require that requesting parties specifically identify requested
information, while also specifying what form the documents should
take. 117 The responding party need only produce information that "is
reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary course of
business.,,118 Texas rules protect privilege and preserve
proportionality in an effective manner by their treatment of cost
shifting. Texas courts shift costs when documents requested are not
reasonably accessible, and they direct the requesting party to pay the
costs of such "extraordinary steps."''19 Texas also has a safe harbor
113. Lawson, supra note 103, at 362.
114. Marcus, supra note 78, at 336-37. See generally CAL. R. CIr. PROC.
115. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment) ("[The] list of forms, media,
and technologies would be ridiculously long and would be superseded by new forms, media, and
technologies by the time the reader was finished."). See generally Hytken, supra note 77, at 895-96.
116. Marcus, supra note 78, at 334; see also Lawson, supra note 103, at 362.
117. TEx. R. Cirv. PRoc. 196.4; see Thomas Y. Allman, Addressing State E-Discovery Issues Through
Rulemaking: The Case for Adopting the 2006 Federal Amendments, 74 DEF. COuNs. J. 233, 238 (2007).
118. Allman, supra note 117, at 238 n.37 ("Texas practitioners argue that this approach has reduced
abusive and excessive discovery requests while providing adequate discovery."); see Lawson, supra
note 103, at 362.
119. Lawson, supra note 103, at 362 (citing TEX. R. CIv. PROC. 196.4); see also Allman, supra note
117, at 238.
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provision, but slightly different from its federal counterpart-Texas
litigants have a ten-day window after the production of documents in
which they may still assert privilege.1 20 So far, courts have not further
interpreted the Texas provision, "perhaps proof of its success."'
121
Mississippi and Idaho recently adopted guidelines similar to Texas's,
further evidence of the state's success. 122
3. The Uniform Rules
Texas lawyers were not the only ones to anticipate the problems
inherent in electronic discovery-both the Conference of Chief
Justices and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) have drafted and promulgated models for
states to follow in adopting rules for e-discovery.
123
The NCCUSL "decided not to reinvent the wheel," and their
Uniform Rules Related to the Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information (Uniform Rules) "mirror[] the spirit and direction of the
recently adopted amendments."' 124 In fact, the Uniform Rules adopt
much of the federal amendments' language, "modified, where
necessary, to accommodate the varying state procedures and are
presented in a form that permits their adoption as a discrete set of
rules applicable to discovery of [ESI].' 25 The advantage of the
Uniform Rules stems from the fact that they comprehensively attempt
to deal with electronic discovery.' 26 They include "all of the major
120. Lawson, supra note 103, at 362 (citing TEx. R. CIv. P. 193.3).
121. Marcus, supra note 78, at 334.
122. See Lawson, supra note 103, at 363; Kenney, supra note 80, at 352.
123. Marcus, supra note 78, at 336; see UNIFORM RULES RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION 1 (2007) [hereinafter UNIFORM RULES]; CONFERENCE OF
CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-
STORED INFORMATION (Richard van Duizend reporter, Aug. 2006) [hereinafter STATE GUIDELINES].
124. UNIFORM RULES, supra note 123, Prefatory Note at 2.
125. Id. The rules attempt to: "(1) provide early attention to electronic discovery issues, (2) provide
better management of discovery into [ESI], (3) set out a procedure for assertions of privilege after
production, (4) clarify the application of the rules relating to interrogatories and requests for production
of documents to [ESI], and (5) clarify the application of the sanctions rules to [ESq." Similar to the
Federal Rules, NCCUSL defines ESI in such a way that it "encompass[es] future developments in
computer technology." UNIFORM RULES, supra note 123, comment to Rule 1.
126. But see Allman, supra note 117, at 238 (despite the best efforts of the NCCUSL, the author notes
that the Uniform Rules are "pithier and have less extensive explanatory comments than the Federal
Amendments").
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attributes of the Federal Rules-inclusion of [ESI]; early meet and
confer conference and order; sanctions limitation in good faith
circumstances; form of production rules," to name a few.' 27 The
Uniform Rules attempt to "encourage states to adopt rules consistent
with the Federal Rule on e-discovery," while incorporating the fact
that state systems are not always similar.
128
Conformity between the federal and uniform rules is not problem
free. Since the Uniform Rules do not substantially depart from the
Federal Rules, they leave the problematic areas of e-discovery
unsolved. The Uniform Rules have been criticized by groups arguing
that differences in state rulemaking procedures make adopting
uniform rules impractical. 129 Therefore, although the Uniform Rules
are a useful start, as they stand they probably do not present the best
option for adoption by the state of Georgia.
4. The State Guidelines
The Conference of Chief Justices created a document entitled
"Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of [ESI],"
State Guidelines designed to help cope with the "emergence of
electronic data systems ... in the discovery of electronic-based...
evidence."'130  The State Guidelines differ from the federal
amendments in several ways: the obligation of counsel to meet and
confer, the scope and format of production, whether metadata must
be produced, cost shifting, inadvertent disclosure, preservation
orders, and safe harbor.1 31 The most significant difference between
127. Lawson, supra note 103, at 363.
128. Larry Hunter, Conditional Admission, 75-Percent Pass Rate, and E-Discovery, 51-MAY ADVOC.
30(2008).
129. Thomas Y. Allman, The Forgotten Cousin: State Rulemaking and Electronic Discovery, 766
PLI/Lrr 317, 331 (2007) (noting that the American Trial Lawyers Association criticized the Uniform
Rules on the idea that no new rules were needed, and that an educational approach emphasizing the
"intricacies of electronic storage, retention, and production" would be more practical).
130. Roland C. Goss, A Comparison of the December 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding the Discovery of Electronically-Stored
Information, SM085 A.L.I.-A.B.A 295, 297-98 (2007) (the Guidelines were approved by the Conference
of Chief Justices on August 2, 2006, and sent to the highest courts of each state for their consideration).
131. See generally Goss, supra note 130 (describing in great detail the differences between the
Federal Rules and the State Guidelines). Compare FED. R. Civ. P., with STATE GUIDELINES.
[Vol. 26:2
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the State Guidelines and the Federal Rules exists in their treatment of
metadata. 132 The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules suggested
that hidden metadata was important only in very few cases, despite
subsequent federal case law to the contrary. 133 On the other hand, the
State Guidelines note the importance of producing metadata, saying
that a judge should require ESI to be produced in a way that
preserves the substantive information of the relevant data.' 34 The
guidelines, however, do not provide much in the way of practical
guidance in the area, going so far as to imply that production of
metadata is voluntary at best.' 35  This treatment is surprising,
especially considering metadata's prominence among electronic
discovery issues.1 36 So, while the Guidelines go a step further than
the Federal Rules, the Guidelines's treatment of metadata illustrates
the need for additional clarification.
Further differences between the two documents abound. For
example, while the Federal Rules "work general disclosures and
discussions of electronic discovery into the existing Rule 26
structure," the State Guidelines provide "much more specific
requirements."'] 37 In terms of production and privilege, the State
Guidelines find data accessible if it is "easily retrievable in the
ordinary course of business." The Guidelines could therefore be
interpreted to prevent transmission of information that is not easily
retrievable. The Federal Rules, on the other hand, maintain a higher
132. Id. at 313-17.
133. The Federal Rules do not contain a specific provision with reference to metadata, "relying on the
developing case law to provide guidance," while also referring to Rule 34(b)(ii) and its requirement that
production be in a form "in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably
useable." Id. at 314-15 (referencing Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan.
2005) and Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04 C 3109, 2006 WL 665005
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006)).
134. STATE GUIDELINES, supra note 123, guideline 6.
135. Goss, supra note 130, at 315-17 (noting the guidelines do not define an acceptable format that
reveals "non-screen information," and states that "substantive" information should be maintained and
produced; the implication is that "non-screen information" is not "substantive" information, and thus
that metadata is not typically discoverable) (citing STATE GUIDELINES, supra note 123, guideline 6).
136. Id. at 316 ("While the evidentiary significance, if any, of different types of metadata will vary
from case to case, it is appropriate to provide a basic level of guidance to the parties in this area, so that
data preservation efforts may be appropriately guided.").
137. Id. at 301, 304 ("Given the current unfamiliarity of many state court judges with e-discovery
issues, more detailed guidance appeared appropriate.").
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standard: "[d]ata is 'not reasonably accessible' if obtaining it would
result in 'undue burden or cost."'
138
III. THE STATE OF THE STATE: PROPOSALS FOR GEORGIA
Part II addressed several of the approaches taken by the federal
government and the states to modernize e-discovery rules. 139 Part III
recommends that Georgia amend its Civil Practice Act 140 by adopting
the amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and suggests several
modifications that the state should consider.141
A. Georgia's State of Being
Georgia is among the many states that have not adopted
comprehensive e-discovery rules. 142 "As of February 1, 2008, the
State of Georgia does not have a rule governing electronic
discovery.' ' 143 Even though computer records play a crucial role in
business and litigation, there has been a startling lack of attention
paid to the subject. 144
Georgia statutes do not distinguish between electronic discovery
and conventional discovery, and provide no guidance to litigants
struggling with modem discovery issues. 145 Georgia's Civil Practice
Act only barely acknowledges the existence of electronic
documents. 146 Georgia Code Section 9-11-26(a), for example, states
138. While the question of whether "technical feasibility of retrieving data should be considered...
may be implicit in the [Federal Rules] .... The State Court Guideline... seems to focus more on the
technical feasibility of retrieving the data, while also considering the cost and burden of production." Id.
at 308 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26 and STATE GUIDELINES, supra note 123, guideline 5).
139. See discussion supra Part II.
140. See generally GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-1 to 9-11-133 (2003). Discovery rules are located in GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-26 to 9-11-37 (2003).
141. See discussion infra Part 11. Adopting the Federal Rules seems like the obvious approach, as
adoption would enable Georgia practitioners in federal court to practice state or federal law under a
fundamentally similar series of rules.
142. Allman, supra note 118, at 237 ("[Only] seven states and the District of Columbia are currently
considering adoption of e-discovery rules based on the 2006 Amendments.").
143. MARY A. PREBULA, 3 GEORGIA PROCEDURE, DISCOVERY § 1:6 (2009).
144. WAYNE M. PURDOM, GEORGIA CIVIL DISCOVERY § 13-6 (6th ed. 2008).
145. PREBULA, supra note 143, § 1:6 (citing Demido v. Wilson, 582 S.E.2d 151 (2003)).
146. GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-26 (2003).
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that parties may obtain discovery by, among other things,
"production of documents." Georgia Code Section 9-11-26(b)(1)
provides that "parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant." Georgia Code Section 9-11-34(a)(1)
allows a party to serve upon another a request for production, but
limits its treatment of electronic documents to "data compilations
from which information can be obtained."'
147
The courts have likewise neglected to address the topic. No
Georgia court has yet undertaken a comprehensive analysis of
electronic discovery issues. 14 8 In fact, Georgia courts have only
incidentally touched upon electronic discovery. 14 9 Instead, Georgia
courts currently rely on ad hoc determination of electronic discovery
issues, and make use of existing discovery rules to accomplish
modem objectives. 150
Noting this apparent lack of concern, one might be tempted to
argue that Georgia's system seems to work fairly well and there is no
reason to fix it. Such a brazen assumption, however, ignores the fact
that "more and more, the courts are taking an active role in policing
the production of electronic discovery."' 51 It also ignores the punitive
capacities of juries. One Florida jury returned a $1.45 billion award
against a company that failed to produce electronic documents in a
timely manner. 152 A jury in North Carolina awarded a plaintiff more
than $830,000 in damages, relying in large part on an adverse
spoliation instruction issued by the judge.' 53 In Connecticut, a court
entered a default judgment in the amount of $5.8 million against a
147. Id. § 9-11-34.
148. The legislature, for its part, has also declined invitations to update Georgia's rules. In 2009, the
General Assembly considered a 129 page bill that was to "substantially revise, supersede, and
modernize" Georgia's evidence code. H.B. 24, 2009 Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009). The bill died in
committee. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 24, Apr. 3, 2009.
149. See, e.g., Demido v. Wilson, 582 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2003) (denying a request for an extension of
discovery, noting that plaintiff failed to show how "inspection of... servers could produce evidence
necessary to establish his remaining claims").
150. Id.
151. Bradley C. Nahrstadt, A Primer on Electronic Discovery: What You Don't Know Can Really
Hurt You, 27 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 17, 31 (2008).
152. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings Inc., 955 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 2007).
153. Arndt v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 613 S.E.2d 274 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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defendant who failed to produce electronic evidence. 154 Dozens of
such cases demonstrate that it is vitally important for litigants to fully
understand the rules and for courts to be bound by them. 155 Georgia
lawmakers must be proactive now in order to avoid bigger issues
later. Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is one way to do
so.
B. Georgia Should Adopt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
It is in Georgia's best interests to adopt the 2006 amended Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,' 56 because the amendments are "practical
and should be incorporated wherever feasible in state rulemaking
efforts."' 57 Furthermore, adopting the Federal Rules would not entail
substantive departure from Georgia's established procedural
system. 158 The Civil Practice Act is modeled after the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and is nearly identical to its federal counterpart,
with only "an occasional difference."' 159 As a result, Georgia courts
often cite federal interpretations of the Federal Rules as persuasive
authority when interpreting the Civil Practice Act, and "frequently
adopt the federal construction for similar Georgia rules."'
160
Therefore, few difficulties in adapting Georgia's current rules to the
Federal Rules would result, with the benefit of providing litigators a
common set of guidelines.161
As important as the Federal Rules are in providing guidance for
judges, counsel, and clients, the rules "do not answer many of the
154. S. New England Tel. Co. v. Golbal NAPs, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-2075 (JCH), 2008 WL 2704495 (D.
Conn. July 1, 2008).
155. See, e.g., Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005); Tantivy
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., No. Civ.A.2:04CV79 (TJW), 2005 WL 2860976, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 1, 2005); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, 234 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Sony
Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Filipiak, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
156. See discussion infra Part IlI.
157. Allman, supra note 117, at 236, 238 ("[E]arly experience with the Federal Amendments is
encouraging. Attorneys and their corporate clients are 'getting it'. .. [and] parties are better prepared
for 'meet and confers."').
158. PREBULA, supra note 143, § 1:1 (2006).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing G.H. Bass & Co. v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 486 S.E.2d 810 (1997);
Bicknell v. CBT Factors Corp., 321 S.E.2d 383 (1984)).
161. See discussion supra Part H.
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most vexing questions judges and litigants face."' 162 For example, the
rules do not govern pre-litigation conduct, since procedural rules
traditionally only apply once litigation commences. Rule 37(e) has
been interpreted to allow a court to impose sanctions for failure to
preserve documents only when litigation is reasonably foreseeable or
ongoing. 163 The rules also do not speak to "the duty of preservation
or the waiver of attorney-client privilege."'164 Such incompleteness
allows Georgia the opportunity to fill in the gaps and provide a more
comprehensive approach to e-discovery. Georgia should, therefore,
adopt the Federal Rules while also taking the opportunity to provide
more detailed guidance.
C. Additional Modifications
1. The Obligation to Meet and Confer
The Federal Rules are based on "a belief that many of the problems
that have occurred in the discovery of electronic data could have been
avoided if counsel for all parties had been knowledgeable" about
their clients' electronic data. 165 Rule 26(f) requires parties to confer
"as soon as practicable" concerning "any issues about disclosure or
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or
forms in which it should be produced."'
166
This general outline could be strengthened by adding specific
requirements. For example, the State Court Guidelines provide that
trial judges should order counsel to confer and exchange (1) [a] list of
162. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at iv.
163. See Thomas Y. Allman, Rule 37() Meets Its Critics: The Justification for a Limited Safe Harbor
for ESI, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2006); Redish, supra note 5, at 619 n.212 (the Rule 37
authority granted judges is normally "construed to be confined to situations in which the party destroyed
evidence following issuance of a discovery order"); Capellipo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 n.14
(D. Minn. 1989) (noting that "Rule 37 does not, by its terms, address sanctions for destruction of
evidence prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or discovery requests"); Isom, supra note 11, at 12
("[Absent] a document preservation order, no rules-based sanctions are available to be inoculated
against by Rule 37(f)."); ABC Home Health Servs., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 158 F.R.D. 180, 182 (S.D. Ga.
1994) ("Rule 37 does not directly apply because the alleged destruction of documents took place before
the action was filed and before discovery began."). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
164. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at iv.
165. Goss, supra note 130, at 299.
166. FED. R. CiV. P. 26(f)(1), 26(f)(3)(C).
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the person(s) most knowledgeable about the relevant computer
system(s) or network(s) . . . ; (2) [a] list of the most likely
custodian(s) . . . of relevant electronic data, together with pertinent
contact information"; and so on. 167  State courts, unfortunately,
"typically do not have the established practice of an early meeting of
counsel followed by 'voluntary' pre-discovery disclosures."' 168 Given
the "current unfamiliarity of many state court judges with e-discovery
issues, more detailed guidance [appears] appropriate., 169 Defining
parties' obligation to meet and confer will ensure that potential
problems arising from electronic discovery are discussed at the outset
of litigation, not during or afterwards.
2. Production of Inaccessible Documents and the "Good Cause"
Standard
Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) allows a party to request information that
otherwise would not be reasonably accessible due to burden or cost if
"good cause" can be shown. 17° What constitutes "good cause,"
however, is not defined within the federal amendments, "leaving
tremendous discretion to judges."' 71 In fact, the good cause standard
can be extraordinarily difficult to define because it is used in several
different rules and many differing contexts. For example, Rule
26(c)(1), which allows the issuance of protective orders, provides that
"[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or
person." Due to the fact that a protective order stands in direct
167. STATE GUIDELINES, supra note 123, guideline 3 (other requirements include (3) a list of each
electronic system that may contain relevant information; (4) an indication whether relevant information
may be of limited accessibility or duration; (5) list of information stored off-site; (6) description of any
efforts undertaken to preserve relevant information; (7) form of production; and (8) notice of any known
problems reasonably anticipated to arise).
168. Goss, supra note 130, at 304.
169. Id.
170. This "good cause" standard should not be confused with the good cause standard used by courts
in determining whether to allow discovery beyond the subject matter of the complaint. In the latter case,
the court looks at whether there is good cause to allow that additional area of discovery. In the case of
electronic discovery, however, the court wants to know whether there is good cause to compel a party to
produce documents that are only limitedly available.
171. Hytken, supra note 77, at 890; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (stating that a court may
order discovery upon a showing of good cause, but provides no standard for action except requesting
courts to "consider[] the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)").
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opposition to the normally liberal rules of discovery, the good cause
standard in that rule is "quite demanding."' 17 2 Rule 26(b)(1) also
articulates a good cause standard, providing that "[flor good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter" of the action. These distinctions have led courts to wonder
whether the good cause standards in 26(b) should be considered only
in reference to Rule 26(b)(2)(C), or whether the considerations
inherent in a 26(c) protective order are meant to apply to 26(b). 173
The amendment has failed to provide "much other guidance to
courts grappling with the new [good cause] standard," with the result
that many courts give the new rules no effect.' 74 Although the
amended rule's vagaries were likely "intended to increase judicial
discretion," the larger problem still persists. 175  Many judges,
including Judge Scheindlin, who decided Zublake v. Warburg, view
the factors articulated in the Advisory Committee's notes as
"overlap[ping] the proportionality considerations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C).' 76 As a result, the factors which were meant to clarify
the rules may just be a "redundant reminder that all discovery is
172. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 49, 86 (2007).
173. Id. This question can become even more confusing because Rule 26(b)(2)(B) can apply either in
the context of a motion to compel or a motion for a protective order. "If a Rule 26(b)(2)(B) objection is
raised by motion for protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), which good cause standard applies?" Id. at
86-87.
174. Hytken, supra note 77, at 891 (citing Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New
E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 52, 86 (2007)); see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)
(The court must consider several factors to determine whether to limit discovery, including whether: "(i)
the discovery is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in action; or (iii) the burden of expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issue.").
175. The problem is that judges hold increased discretion but are increasingly unclear as to how they
should appropriately exercise that discretion. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New
E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 90 (2007). Increased judicial discretion in applying the
federal rules may indeed have been the intended result. "[J]udges have come to dominate membership
on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad discretion." Id.
(citing Robert G. Bone, Who Decides?: A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
1961, 1974 (2007)).
176. Noyes, supra note 175, at 72 (citing SHtRA A. SCHEINDLIN, E-DISCOvERY: THE NEWLY
AMENDED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (2006) (supplement to JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d. ed. 2006))).
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subject to the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).' 77  Policymakers
should strongly consider either creating distinct factors for each
doctrine or clearly applying the same test for both.
The Sedona Principles provide a potential solution, and suggest
taking into account "the technological feasibility and realistic costs of
preserving, retrieving, reviewing, and producing electronically stored
information" to achieve balance. 178 Principle 6 "expands the concept
by noting that 'responding parties are best situated' to evaluate the
appropriate procedures, methodologies and technologies to preserve
and produce their electronically stored information."'
179
Other scholars have opined that "clarifying amendments" should
be introduced, such as stating "a presumption in favor of cost shifting
of production in regard to inaccessible information."' 80 Policy makers
also could integrate the Zublake factors into the "good cause" or cost
shifting analysis, which would be a wise choice considering the
amount of attention the factors receive from courts. 
181
3. Safe Harbor Provisions and Litigation Holds
Federal Rule 37 provides a "safe harbor" provision in order to
protect parties who have inadvertently destroyed discoverable
documents. 182 Although this rule generally protects parties acting in
good faith, Georgia should consider a more comprehensive and
protective approach. 183 The Advisory Committee, in drafting the
177. Id (citing Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2006)).
178. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 7.
179. Id. at 7.
180. See Allman, supra note 117, at 238 n.38; see SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note
13, at 7 ("[T]he costs of 'retrieving and reviewing' electronically stored information that is not
'reasonably available' may be shifted to the requesting party.").
181. See Zublake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Allman, supra note
117, at 237 (noting the impact of federal case law, and the success of states in "converting the
underlying principles in federal precedent to contexts unique to state law" (referencing O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. App. 2005)).
182. See discussion supra Part I; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (the rule currently provides that a court
"may not impose sanctions... on a party for failing to provide [ES1] lost as a result of the routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic information system").
183. A producing party has the burden of showing that the information was lost as a result of a
"routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system." FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e).
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federal amendments, considered an alternative version of Rule 37 that
was an "intermediate standard between negligence and intentional
malfeasance."' 84 The original rule would have protected a party
unless it "violated an order in the action requiring it to preserve."
'' 85
Despite signs that courts are showing a "more balanced approach
[when] evaluating the good faith discharge of preservation
obligations,"'1 86 other scholars think that the "safe harbor" provision
should presumptively apply "even when information otherwise slips
through due to human error, so long as reasonable efforts were made
to effectuate a litigation hold.' '187 New rules should carefully balance
the pros and cons of each possibility and clearly dictate the
underlying reasons behind the outcome.
Indeed, Rule 37 does not provide "bright lines upon which a
producing party can rely in planning its preservation compliance
policies."'188 At the moment, a party must look "outside the rules to
other practitioner guides and local jurisdictions"-an undesirable
outcome for anyone seeking a clear answer.1 89 Although solving this
problem may reach outside the scope of traditional discovery rules,
clearly defining when a party's preservation obligations attach is an
invaluable consideration.
4. Metadata and Form of Production
The Federal Rules do not explicitly mention metadata, but
indirectly treat the issue as one to be dealt with on a case by case
184. Hytken, supra note 77, at 892.
185. Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The Search for a Limited Safe Harbor, 2 FED. CTS. L.
REV. 65, 75 (2007). The author notes that the Committee chose a lesser standard of fault-good faith-
rather than the "higher standard of culpability or fault, such as recklessness or gross negligence" that
public comment advocated for. Id. at 76.
186. Thomas Y. Altman, Addressing State E-Discovery Issues Through Rulemaking: The Case for
Adopting the 2006 Federal Amendments, 74 DEF. CouNs. J. 233, 236 (2007) (citing Cache La Poudre
Feeds, L.L.C. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., No. 04-cv-003929-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 684001 (D. Col. Mar. 2,
2007); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. ALCOA, Civ. No. 03-1055-C-M2, 2006 WL 2583308 (M.D. La.
July 19, 2006).
187. Allman, supra note 117, at 238 n.38 (2007). Federal Rule 37 only states that a court may not
impose sanctions for documents lost as a result of routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system unless exceptional circumstances exist. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
188. Hytken, supra note 77, at 894 (citing Allman, supra note 187, at 79).
189. Hytken, supra note 77, at 894.
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basis. 190 The rules require, with the exception of an agreement by the
parties to the contrary, that documents be produced in the format "in
which [they are] ordinarily maintained."' 91 Unfortunately for
receiving parties, however, documents might be "ordinarily
maintained" in a form other than their native format. 192 Stated
another way, the format in which the documents are typically stored
may not be the best format for viewing hidden metadata. Such an
obstacle could cost both producing and requesting parties frustration
and expense. This issue can be solved by adopting rules that instruct
courts to "tak[e] into account the need to produce reasonably
accessible metadata that will enable the receiving party to have the
same ability to access, search, and display the information as the
producing party."'1
93
CONCLUSION: AND THE ROAD GOES EVER ONWARD
Electronic discovery, a complicated and time consuming endeavor,
is the natural result of litigation's advancement into the Digital Age.
The technology that drives society brings with it many complications,
but many possibilities as well. Electronic documents present
previously unseen questions of preservation, privilege, and
proportionality due to their unique volume, retrieval methods, and
modes of translation. 194 The legal profession cannot remain outside
the reach of this technological advancement-the rules must advance
to keep pace with society.
Many organizations seek to keep that pace-the drafters of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the State Guidelines, the Sedona
190. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 8 ("Rule 26(f) instead emphasizes
the need to discuss this topic early to attempt to reach agreement, and Rule 34(b) provides a process for
resolving disputes.").
191. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
192. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 8 ("It is common for electronic
information to be migrated to a number of different applications and formats in the ordinary course of
business . . . [and] [r]outine migration will likely result in the loss or alteration of some elements of
metadata associated with the native application.").
193. SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION), supra note 13, at 60, principle 12. For further
discussion and commentary on dealing with metadata, see id. at 60-66.
194. See discussion supra Part I.
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Conference, and state legislatures-and each has found unique
solutions for the questions presented. 195 The Federal Rules present
the best opportunity for Georgia, since Georgia's current procedural
system already closely resembles the federal one.1 96 That said,
however, there is no reason the state must stop there. Georgia should
consider modifications and additions to address ambiguities in "Meet
and Confer" rules, "Good Cause" production standards, "Safe
Harbor" and preservation obligations, discovery of metadata, and
proper form of production. 197 This list is certainly not exhaustive,
though-technology will continue to change, and, as it does,
modifications will undoubtedly be necessary to craft new rules and
exceptions.
The cause of advancement is promoted by many, but the general
difficulty in such scenarios typically comes from resistance from
practitioners and judges, the very people who work within the state's
own legal system. They are used to a certain set of rules and norms,
and will try to stick to the old rules in order to preserve that with
which they are familiar. But what cost does that familiarity impose?
Litigants are becoming aware of the potential pitfalls of electronic
discovery, but are unable to effectively navigate them. Juries are not
deterred from imposing punitive damages by the fact that electronic
discovery issues are new, and judges have a wide degree of discretion
when considering sanctions. So which is the better case-defining the
rules of the game now, when there is time to respond, or instead
soaking up million dollar losses in preventable electronic discovery
sanctions? Indecision is expensive. In order to meet the demands of
electronic records storage, Georgia must take affirmative action.
195. See discussion supra Part II.
196. See discussion supra Part III.B.
197. See discussion supra Part 1Il.
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